Abstract-This paper is concerned with several security notions for information theoretically secure encryptions defined by the variational (statistical) distance. To ensure the perfect secrecy (PS), the mutual information is often used to evaluate the statistical independence between a message and a cryptogram. On the other hand, in order to recognize the information theoretically secure encryptions and computationally secure ones comprehensively, it is necessary to reconsider the notion of PS in terms of the variational distance. However, based on the variational distance, three kinds of definitions for PS are naturally introduced, but their relations are not known. In this paper, we clarify that one of three definitions for PS with the variational distance, which is a straightforward extension of Shannon's perfect secrecy, is stronger than the others, and the weaker two definitions of PS are essentially equivalent to the statistical versions of indistinguishability and semantic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perfect secrecy (PS) is a strong security notion which is secure against an adversary with unbounded computing power. Perfect secrecy was defined by Shannon [1] , and he proved that perfect secrecy is achieved by one time pad (Vernam) cipher [2] . Furthermore, in order to achieve perfect secrecy, Shannon also proved in [1] that the entropy of a key must be greater than the entropy of a message, which makes perfect secrecy quite impractical.
Roughly speaking, PS is defined by the statistical indepen dence between a message M and a cryptogram C. Specifically, we often require almost statistical independence between C and M to ensure PS. We note here that two metrics can be used to measure the almost statistical independence, i.e., the mutual information and the variational (statistical) distance. In general, the mutual information is often used in information theoretic cryptography since it guarantees stronger security compared to the security notions based on the variational distance due to Pinsker ' s inequality. On the other hand, the variational distance is often used in computationally secure cryptography: For instance, indistinguishability (IND) and semantic security (SS) are defined in terms of the variational distance. We note that several researchers recently discussed one time pad cipher under the security notions developed in computationally secure cryptography. For instance, Russel Wang [3] introduced entropic security based on semantic security, and they succeeded in shortening the key length of a symmetric key cryptosystem which is secure against an unbounded adversary. In addition, Dodis-Smith [4] introduced another security notion which is closely related to indistin guishability, and they gave the other realization of entropic security by using extractors [5] .
Given the above backgrounds, we are interested in PS defined by the variational distance, and its relation to IND and
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Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, the University of Electro-Communications 1-5-1 Chofugaoka, Chofu-shi, Tokyo, 182-8585 Japan Email: ota@inf.uec.ac.jp SS, which will be some help for comprehensive understanding of information theoretically secure encryptions and computa tionally secure ones. However, as we will see in Definition 2, three kinds of definitions of PS denoted by PS*M(E), PSC*(E), and PSCM(E) can be naturally introduced in terms of the variational distance. It is obvious that these three notions of PS are the same when E = O. However, in the case of E > 0, their relations are not known. In this paper, we will point out that PS*M(E) is stronger than the others by showing a pathological example. Furthermore, it will be proved that the remaining two definitions PSC*(E) and PSCM(E) guarantee essentially the same security as the statistical versions of IND and SS. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, notations and three variations of PS are introduced. Statistical IND is introduced in section III, and the relations between PS and statistical IND are clarified. A relation between statistical IND and statistical SS is proven in Section IV. Finally, a gap between one of three variations of PS and the other security notions are pointed out in Section V. Technical lenunas are provided in Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let M, K, and C be random variables taking values in finite sets M, K, and e, which correspond to sets of messages, keys, and cryptograms, respectively. For a random variable X taking values in a finite set X and an element x E X, denote by Px(x) a probability of X = x. Let P(X) be the totality of probability distributions over X.
A synunetric key cryptography � consists of a probability distribution PK E P(K) of a key, and a pair of an encryption function Ene : M x K ---+ e, and a decryption function Dee: e x K ---+ M, i.e., � �f (PK, Ene, Dee ) . Note that K is chosen independently of a message M, and Ene and Dee are deterministic maps. Suppose that a message is generated according to a probability distribution PM E P(M). Then, the probability distribution Pc of a cryptogram is determined by PM, PK and Ene. Let PCM be a joint probability distribution of a cryptogram C and a message M, and denote by PClM a conditional distribution of a cryptogram when a message is given. Denote by IPclM an lei x I M I transition probability matrix ' associated with {PClM(clm)}cEc,mEM, i.e., each element of IPClM corresponds to PClM(clm) for c E e and m E M. The following theorem states fundamental properties of PCIM for symmetric key encryptions. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
'I . I denotes the cardinality of a set.
Theorem 1: If a key K is chosen independently of a mes sage M, it holds that2 \Ie E C, \1m E M, PClM(elm) = Pr {Ene(m, K) = e} . (1) Furthennore, in the case of ICI = IMI, there exists a symmetric key cryptosystem � satisfying (1) iff (if and only it) the probability transition matrix IF' CI M is doubly stochastic 3 .
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Hence, we assume that the conditional probability distribu tion PClM(clm), e E C, m E M is naturally defined by (1) if a symmetric key cryptosystem � is given.
Shannon defined the notion of perfect secrecy as follows: Definition 1 (Perfect secrecy, [1 J): A symmetric key cryp tosystem � = (PK, Ene, Dee) guarantees perfect secrecy if
is satisfied for arbitrary message distribution PM.
Definition 1 means that no information of a message can be obtained from a cryptogram since a priori probability distribution PM of a message coincides with a posteriori probability distribution of M computed by an adversary using a cryptogram.
It is easy to see that (2) is equivalent to
since (2) means that random variables M and C are statisti cally independent.
We are now consider relaxed definitions of perfect secrecy. That is, we define almost independence between a message M and a cryptogram C given by (2) - (4) in terms of the variational (statistical) distance4 denoted by de . ).
Definition 2: For a real number E E [0,1], we say that a sYlmnetric key cryptosystem � is PS*M(E)-, PSC*(E)-, or PSCM(E)-secure if � satisfies the following conditions:
As shown above, PS*M(O), PSc*(O) and PSCM(O) are equivalent to (2) - (4), respectively, and they are all equivalent. In this paper, we are interested in relations among these security notions when E is positive and sufficiently small. The main results of this paper are summarized as follows:
• PS*M (E) is the strongest among three security notions in Definition 2, which reflects the observation that PS*M (E) is the most straightforward extension of (2) in Definition 1.
• Two security notions in Definition 2 except for PS*M(E) are equivalent to each other, and they are essentially equivalent to the statistical versions of indistinguishability 2Pr {. } is a probability with respect to a Uoint) probability distribution of random variable(s) between the parentheses.
3 A probability transition matrix IF' elM is doubly stochastic iff I: cEC P qM( elm) = I:mEM P qM( elm) = 1 holds.
4 For two probability distributions Px, Py over a finite set A, the varia- and semantic security which will be introduced later. As a result, it is clarified that indistinguishability and semantic security are weaker security notions even if they are fonnulated in information theoretically secure setting.
III. PERFECT SECRECY AND INDISTINGUISHABILITY
We reformulate the security notion of indistinguishability denoted by IND(E) which is suitable for infonnation theoret ically secure setting. Then, we discuss the relation between IN D (E) and three notions of perfect secrecy presented in Definition 2.
It is easy to see that (3) is also represented as \lmo, \lml E M, \Ie E C, PClM(elmo) = PClM(elmd, which is equiva lent to \lmo, \1m 1 EM , d(PcIMClmo), PCIMClmr)) = 0. (5) Note that (5) implies that cryptograms corresponding to ar bitrarily chosen messages mo and ml cannot be statistically distinguished.
We now relax the condition given by (5) using a real number E E [0,1] such that \lmo, \lml EM, d(PClMClmo), PClMClmr)) ::; E. (6) According to the definition of variational distance, d( Px , Py) ::; E can be rewritten as \If:.A --., {O, I}, I Pr{f(X) = I} -Pr{J(Y ) = 1} 1 ::; E (7) and hence, (6) is equivalent to \lmo E M, \lml EM, \If: C --., {O, I}, IPr{J(C) = 1 1 M = mol -Pr{J(C) = 11M = mr} I ::; E. (8) Note that, (8) is the definiton of computational indistin guishability if the function f is restricted to the family of functions which can be computed in polynomial time [7, 8] . Hence, we introduce a security notion of statistical indistin guishability based on (8) as follows.
Definition 3: For a real number E E [0,1], we say that a symmetric key cryptosystem � is statistically E indistinguishable (IND(E)-secure, for short) if � satisfies (6) (and also (8) ).
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Remark 1: Statistical indistinguishability introduced by Dodis-Smith [4] looks different from Definition 3, but it is easy to show that they are essentially the same.
In the following, we clarify the relation among security notions in Definitions 2 and 3.
First, we show that � is P5C*(E)-secure if � is IND(E) secure. In this case, we assume that \:1m, \:1m' E M, d(PClMClm), PClMClm')) ::; E, and hence, from (9) we have
and hence � is P5c* (E )-secure.
(10)
We prove the converse. Suppose that � is P5c* (E )-secure. Substitute both m = mo and into (9). Then, we obtain if m' = ml otherwise Hence, � is IND(E)-secure if it is P5c*(E)-secure.

The next theorem implies an equivalence between IND(E) and P5CM(E).
Theorem 3:
This proof is essentially the same with Theorem 2. Observe that d(PCM, Pc PM ) can be calculated as follows:
In this case, we have from 
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We have proved that P5C*(E), P5CM(E), and IND(E) are the same security notions. On the other hand, in section V, we show an example that P5*M (E) is stronger security notion than the others in the case of E > O.
IV. PERFECT SECRECY AND SEMANTIC SECURITY
We consider the relation between perfect secrecy and se mantic security in information theoretically secure setting. Here, IND(E) also plays a crucial role.
Definition 4 (Statistical semantic security, [3] ): For every real number E E [0,1] we say that a sYlmnetric key cryptosys tem � = (PK, Ene, Dee) is statistically E-semantic secure (55 (E)-secure, for short) if, for an arbitrary distribution of a message PM E P(M) and for an arbitrary map f : C ----+ {O, I}, there exists a random variable G j that depends on f but is independent of M, so that for every map h : M ----+ {O, I}, it holds that
Intuitively, Definition 4 implies that a cryptogram C is almost useless to obtain anyone bit information of a message M, since (17) implies that, in order to guess one bit informa tion h(M) of a message M, there is no difference between by using a cryptogram C and a map f, and by using f only with a random coin.
Remark 2: In [3] , (t, E)-entropic security is defined if a symmetric key cryptosystem � satisfies Definition 4 for every message with min-entropy t, and it is shown that the key length is reduced to n -t + w(log n ) bits for (t, n -w( l ) ) _ entropic security6. Hence, Definition 4 coincides with (0, E) entropic security. Furthermore, it is pointed out in [3] that (O,O)-entropic security is equivalent to PS in Definition 1. D We are interested in the relation between PS introduced in Definition 2, and statistical semantic security 55( E) when E > O. To see this, we show the following relation between IND(E) and 55(E). [8] under computationally secure setting. Let M* be a random variable of a message which is independent of the legitimate message M. Then, assume that the random variable Gj is generated by PClM(clm) and Then, the left hand side of (17) can be evaluated as
where !h ,m o :
1 iff :ll. j,h(C, m) = 1. Then, due to the definition of IND(E) given by (5) , it is easy to see that (19) can be bounded from above by L mo,mlEM PM (mo)PM* (m I
) . E = E.
Conversely, we show that � is IN D ( 4E )-secure if � is SS (E )-secure. Assuming that a sYlmnetric key cryptosystem
� is SS(E)-secure, there exist an arbitrary f: C ----+ {O, I} and a random variable G j that depends on f but is independent of M, and (17) holds for an arbitrary h :
Now, letting h be a map that always outputs 1 for every m E M, it holds for arbitrary f : C ----+ {O, I} that Ipr{J(C) = I} -Pr{Gj = 1} 1 ::; E (20) which is equivalent to Ipr{f(C) = O} -Pr{Gj = O}I ::; E. Hence, for £ E {O, I}, it holds that Pr {f(C) = £} 2:: Pr {G j = £} -E
Multiplying both sides by Pr {h(M) = £} 2:: 0, we have
and hence, it follows that Since PM E P(M) is arbitrary, we set PM in the same way as (15) for arbitrarily fixed mo, mi E M, and let h(m) = omo (m) which is defined by (11). Then, (27) becomes
Therefore, d(PcIMClmo), PCIMClml)) ::; 4E is established for every mo, mi EM. We show an exmaple of a symmetric key cryptosystem � that is IND(E)-secure (and hence, it is also PSC*(E) and PSCM(E)-secure) with arbitrarily small E > 0, while it is PS*M(E')-secure with E' 2:: 1/2. This fact means that PS*M(E) is stronger than the other security notions. We note that PS*M(E) is a straightforward extension of Shannon ' s perfect secrecy given by (2) in Definition l.
Example 1: For an arbitrary even integer n, define C = {Cl, C2, ... , cn} and M = {ml, m2, ... , mn}. Then, consider the following n x n probability transition matrix corresponding to PClM such that
n-I n-I n-I n-I where 0 = E/2 E (0, n-I], and the (i,j) element of IF'ClM is equal to PClM(cilmj). From Theorem 1, note that there exists a symmetric key cryptosystem �ex corresponding to (29) since it is doubly stochastic.
It is easy to check that d(PcIMClmi), PCIMClmj)) is equal to 0 or 20 ( = E) for each mi, mj E M. Hence, IF' CIM realizes a IND(E)-secure symmetric key cryptosystem (and hence, it is also PSC*(E)-, and PSCM(E)-secure).
7 Let X and Y in Lemma 1 be fCC) and heM) , respectively. which implies that �ex is PS*M(E')-secure withS E' 2': nO/2. In particular, E' 2': 1/2 for every n if E = 2/n ( = 20 ) which can be arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n.
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In this example, the symmetric key cryptosystem �ex given by (29) violates d( PMl cClc ) , PM C)) :s; E with the negligibly small probability Pr {C = Cl V C = C2} = 2/n if PM is uniform and n is sufficiently large, although it is required by PS*M(E)-security to satisfy d( PMl cClc ) , PM C)) :s; E for every c E C. On the other hand, �ex is still considered to be secure under the other security notions since they focus on the probability distribution of C and the probability that such insecure cryptograms are output is negligible. Observe that a random variable C of a cryptogram is ob tained by C = Ene (M , K), where M and K are independent random variables of a message and a key, respectively, and Ene: M x lC ---+ C is a deterministic map of encryption. Hence, the joint probability distribution PCM (C , m ) of a cryptogram and a message can be represented as where the marked equality holds since M and K are indepen dent. Hence, we have (1) .
In what follows, we consider the case of 1 M I = I c!. In this case, if k E lC is fixed, there exists a bijection 7r k : M ---+ C since every cryptogram c E C can be uniquely decrypted by k E lC. Hence, for each k E lC, let Ih E {o, l}n xn be a permutation matrix which corresponds to the bijection 7r k . Then, it is easy to see that the probability transition matrix induced by Ene and K can be represented as 
